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Abstract—The seldom addressed network hierarchy property 
and its relationship with vulnerability analysis for power 
transmission grids from complex systems point of view is given in 
this paper. We analyze and compare the evolution of network 
hierarchy for the dynamic vulnerability evaluation of four 
different power transmission grids of real cases. Several 
meaningful results suggest that the vulnerability of power grids 
can be assessed by means of a network hierarchy evolution 
analysis. Firstly, the network hierarchy evolution may be used as 
a novel measurement to quantify the robustness of power grids. 
Secondly, an anti-pyramidal structure appears in the most robust 
network when quantifying cascading failures by the proposed 
hierarchy metric. Furthermore, the analysis results are also 
validated and proved by empirical reliability data. We show that 
our proposed hierarchy evolution analysis methodology could be 
used to assess the vulnerability of power grids or even other 
networks from a complex systems point of view. 
 
Index Terms—Complex networks, hierarchy, power grids, 
vulnerability, cascading failures. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
IERARCHY property is an important characteristic of 
complex networks [1]-[5]. Complex systems are usually 
characterized by some level of hierarchy, which spans in time 
and space at different scales. This hierarchical structure 
commonly allows reducing costs in terms of reliably 
transmitted information but at the same time involves different 
dynamical responses to malfunctions. Power grids, especially 
power transmission networks, have been widely studied under 
the complex network science framework, and basic topological 
characteristics and statistical global graph properties have been 
analyzed for many power grids around the world [6]. Thus, 
power systems considered as typical complex networks, would 
also be featured with the hierarchy property. However, to our 
best knowledge, existing researches about complex network 
theory in power grids mainly focus on very common measures 
taken from graph theory, like degree, efficiency, betweenness, 
etc., and for structural vulnerability analysis [6]-[8]. Research 
concerning the relation between hierarchy and vulnerability has 
been seldom addressed except for [9] where only simple graph 
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models and hierarchy metrics are taken into consideration. In 
this paper, we extend the static metric to the evolution of 
network hierarchy for dynamic evaluation of power system 
vulnerability, which has been seldom addressed among the 
complex system approaches but would greatly change the 
judgments on power system vulnerability.  
To be more specific, among different network evolution 
properties indicating the dynamic behavior in terms of system 
vulnerability, an especially important one to be addressed and 
adopted in this paper is the hierarchy metric, quantifying the 
network pyramidal structure [10]-[12]. Here, and in order to 
quantify this pyramidal property in the case of a power 
network, we adopt and simplify “treeness” [13] as our metric to 
analyze hierarchy evolution property of power networks, and to 
achieve balance between accuracy and computation burden. It’s 
noticed that the hierarchy conception is based on a directed 
network which is also a natural feature for power network due 
to its power flow. Therefore, the DC power flow model is used 
and calculated to obtain branch flows and to generate the 
corresponding directed graph.  
Based on the proposed hierarchy metric and the directed 
graph model, we applied this approach to analyze the evolution 
of hierarchy in power grids from a dynamic process performed 
with node removal. The strategy of randomly removing buses, 
one by one, was adopted, and the corresponding hierarchy 
metric is calculated and recorded. We found that hierarchy 
trends illustrated by our proposed metric can be translated as a 
footprint of power system vulnerability (caused by node 
removal) from complex network point of view. 
The methodology has been applied in the following steps. 
Firstly, the topological characteristics of four power networks 
are carefully checked to make sure they are compatible from 
complex network theory point of view. Secondly, to more 
precisely investigate the dynamic behavior of the power grids, 
the network hierarchy evolution observation is incorporated 
into the cascading failures model. By the simulation, a 
correlation between network hierarchy evolution and cascading 
failures propagation was analyzed and built. An initial 
correlation between network hierarchy evolution and system 
vulnerability was given. Finally, we also try to use the 
empirical data supplied by ENTSO to validate our previous 
findings.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 
II introduces the proposed mathematical and simulation 
methods. Section III describes the case studies used in this 
paper and their corresponding analyses are also addressed. The 
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reliability validation with empirical data is presented in section 
IV for further discussion of previous results from a more 
practical point of view. Section V highlights the key findings of 
this paper and draws conclusions.  
II. MATHEMATICAL APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY 
A. Traditional topology metrics  
The power network could be abstracted as an undirected 
graph model Gu = (n,m), consisting of two sets n and m, such 
that n ≠ ∅ and m is a set of unordered pairs of elements of n. 
The elements of n ≡ {n1, n2, . . . , nN} are the nodes (or vertices) 
of the graph Gu, while the elements of m ≡ {m1, m2, . . . , mM} 
are the links (or edges) [14].  
The connectivity of a node is measured by its degree, ki, 
which is defined as the number of edges connected to a given 
node i [15]. The average degree <k> describes the average 
connectivity of all vertices in a graph [16]: 
 
1
i
i m
k k
M ∈
< >= ∑                                    (1) 
 
Shortest path length dij is the number of edges in the shortest 
path between node i to node j. Typical separation between two 
nodes in the graph is given by the average path length L, 
defined as the mean of dij over all couples of nodes [17]: 
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In a network, clustering coefficient is introduced to quantify 
the average connectivity of neighbors of nodes in a network. 
The overall level of clustering is measured by the average of the 
local clustering coefficients 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 over all nodes [17]: 
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B. Hierarchy measure for power grids  
Hierarchy can be seen as some kind of relations about the 
interactions between the system elements. Therefore, in this 
paper we would like to address the hierarchy evolution of 
power grids by means of a directed graph G = (V,E), consisting 
of two sets V and E, such that V ≠ ∅ and E is the pairs of 
elements in V. The elements of V are the vertices (or nodes) of 
the graph G corresponding to the buses. And each edge {vi, 
vj}∈E is characterized by its reactance xij=xji>0 denoting the 
transmission lines [18]. As a directed graph, {vi, vj }∈E also 
denotes an arrow going from vi to vj. Furthermore, to obtain the 
directed graph model of a power network, power flow 
calculations need to be carried out for the flow direction of each 
edge. For the sake of simplicity, a linearized (or DC) power 
flow model is adopted [19]. Given the power supply/demand 
vector 1VP ×∈�  where pv is the active power supply (pv>0) or 
demand (pv<0) at node v V∈ , the DC power flow equation is 
given in matrix form as follows: 
 
P Bθ=                                           (4) 
 
where 1Vθ ×∈�  is the vector of phase angles and V VB ×∈�  is 
the admittance matrix of the graph G defined as: 
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After solving θ  by (4), the branch flow 1EEP
×∈�  could be 
calculated by: 
 
EP DAθ=                                       (5) 
 
where E ED ×∈�  is defined as: 
0,               
1 / ,      ij ij
if i j
d
x if i j
≠= − =
 
and E VA ×∈� is known as the incidence matrix [20] whose 
element aij is 1 if the ith branch begins at node j, -1 if the ith 
branch terminates at node j, and 0 otherwise. Here, a branch is 
said to “begin” at node j if the power flowing across branch i is 
defined positive for a direction from node j to the other node, on 
the contrary defined as “terminate”.  
As an example, the DC power flow of WSCC 9-bus system is 
solved by MATPOWER 4.0 and the power flow direction of 
each branch is denoted in Fig. 1 (a). The corresponding directed 
graph is abstracted and shown in Fig. 1 (b).  
 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Fig. 1. Directed graph abstracted from power network. (a) DC power flow 
result of WSCC 9-bus system by MATPOWER 4.0; (b) the corresponding 
directed graph. 
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In this paper, and based on directed graph model for power 
networks, a hierarchy measure to quantify the pyramidal 
structure of a power grid is simplified and drawn from [13]. We 
would like to use a simplified version of “treeness” as the 
hierarchy metric of power grids which accounts for the 
pyramidal structure: 
 
( ) ( )
( )
max{ ( ), ( )}
f b
f b
H G H G
T G
H G H G
−
=                     (6) 
 
where ( )fH G  and ( )bH G  measure the diversity of choices 
we can make going top–down (following the arrows of the 
structure) vs. the uncertainty generated when reverting the 
paths going bottom–up: 
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where CG  is the DAG (directed acyclic graph) of G which is a 
directed graph characterized by the absence of cycles, and the 
set M denotes the nodes whose in-degree equals  zero: 
{ : ( ) 0}i in iM v V k v= ∈ =  
Here, kin is the in-degree of vi that indicates the number of 
ingoing (the flow injected in the node) links of vi, and ( )ih v  
measures the uncertainty associated to a given path starting 
form vi and ending to some node in 𝜇𝜇: 
 
ℎ(𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖) = ∑ ℙ(𝜋𝜋𝑘𝑘|𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖)logℙ(𝜋𝜋𝑘𝑘|𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖)𝜋𝜋𝑘𝑘∈Π𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀           (8) 
 
where ℙ(𝜋𝜋𝑘𝑘|𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖) is the probability that the path 𝜋𝜋𝑘𝑘 is followed, 
starting from node iv M∈ . Here, set 𝜇𝜇  denotes the nodes 
whose out-degree equal to zero: 
{ : ( ) 0}i out iv V k vµ = ∈ =  
where kout is the out-degree of vi that indicates the number of 
outgoing links of vi, and the set of all paths 𝜋𝜋1,…, 𝜋𝜋𝑠𝑠, from M to 
𝜇𝜇 is indicated as Π𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝐺𝐺).  
To obtain ( )bH G , the analogue expression of (8) can be 
applied just reversing the flow defined by the arrows in G. 
The general procedure to calculate the treeness of a power 
network is: firstly, build the corresponding directed graph by 
DC power flow calculation; secondly generate the 
corresponding DAG model; finally, calculate T(G) following 
(6). 
C. Observations of hierarchy trends 
The main motivation for the studies of power grids in 
network theory is the assessment of resilience (or vulnerability) 
[21]-[23]. Specifically, in order to provide a sustained 
functioning capacity, power networks must be designed to 
withstand a considerable amount of random removal of some 
important elements. Such directed impairment to this kind of 
network has dramatic structural effects, typically leading to 
network fragmentation [24]. Based on this consideration, we 
assume that a power grid failure will also be revealed as a 
variation in the hierarchy coordinates. In this sense, we analyse 
the relationship between random bus and generator removal 
and the evolution of the network hierarchy. 
A Monte Carlo based simulation is proposed and carried out 
repeatedly in the following steps:  
Step 1: a random node is uniformly selected and removed 
from the power network (and for the next simulation cycle, the 
same action would be done for a second random node);  
Step 2: the largest connected island containing at least one 
generator would be found in the remaining network and DC 
power flow of the survival largest island would be carried out to 
generate its according directed graph model;  
Step 3: calculate the hierarchy metric (treeness) for the 
largest connected island to observe the hierarchy trends; 
Step4: go to step 1 to randomly select and remove another 
node, and repeat these same steps until only one generator node 
exist in the resulting largest island. 
The previous simulation algorithm is repeated a selected 
number of times with a different sequence of nodes to be 
removed for each network case study. Here four transmission 
power networks case studies have been selected: Germany 
(DE), France (FR), Spain (ES) and Italy (IT). 
D. Vulnerability and network hierarchy evolution 
Several models have been proposed for explaining the 
complex behavior of cascading failures in power networks 
[25]-[28]. Generally speaking, there are two kinds of technical 
approaches. One is the traditional N-1 contingency simulation. 
The other is a simplified version where only the network 
topology is taken into account. To achieve a balance between 
the computation complexity (in terms of number of buses and 
lines, especially for DE and FR networks) and simulation 
accuracy, we propose a modified version which overcomes the 
shortcoming of simplified cascading failures model. In Motter's 
work [27], the network flow is quantified by the shortest path 
length which counts the edges connecting each pair of nodes. In 
Crucitti’s work [28], a weighted network is used, the shortest 
path is the path with minimal sum of weights of edges between 
two nodes. However, power network is a flow based network 
where power is transmitted from power plants to consumers not 
only along the shortest path but also the remaining paths, 
following not purely by topological rules. To describe the flow 
redistribution mechanism in cascading failure propagation, a 
DC power flow could be taken into consideration. Some 
researches [29] have addressed the line outage cascading model 
for power networks based on the DC power flow equation. 
 
(1 ) (0)i iCap La= +                                  (9) 
 
where 𝛼𝛼 ≥ 0 plays the role of a tolerance parameter, and Li(0) 
is the load of each node for the intact network. 
The node outage cascading failure is carried out as 
following: randomly select a node and remove it from the 
network as it fails; then the power flow undergoes a 
redistribution, and consequently, the loads on each surviving 
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node change. If the node has a large load, its removal will 
probably affect the loads of the rest of the nodes. If the new load 
after flow redistribution of any surviving node exceeds its 
capacity (i.e., 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 ≥ 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖), then that node will also fail, which 
leads to a further redistribution and possible further failures 
until a certain point in time, when all loads in the  remaining 
nodes are lower than or equal to their capacity. 
The cascading failures propagation may lead to the network 
fragmentation and the loss of power consumption. For power 
systems, the surviving power consumption is suitable to 
evaluate the consequence of cascading failures: 
 
/new initialratioP P P=                          (10) 
 
where 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛is the existing power generation belonging to the 
largest network component after the cascade, and 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  is the 
original total power generation. 
The cascading failures model considered in our examination 
and the hierarchy evolution are performed as following: 
Step 1: Calculate the capacity for each bus according to (9) 
and set the initial value of control parameter 𝛼𝛼 as 0.1. 
Step 2: Randomly (following uniform distribution) remove a 
node from the network. 
Step 3: Find the largest island among the fractions caused by 
the node removal. Notice that only the island with at least one 
generator has source for energy dispatching. 
Step 4: Calculate the hierarchy metric value for the island 
found in step 3. 
Step 5: Redistribute the power flow by (7) and (8) in the 
island found in step 3 and update the load on each bus following 
redistribution results. 
Step 6: Compare the newly distributed load with the capacity 
of each bus and remove the buses whose load exceed their 
capacity to trigger the next failure. 
Step 7: Calculate the surviving power consumption of the 
largest connected component according to (10). 
Step 8: Go to Step 3 and find the largest island with a 
generator, until no generator can be found in each island. 
Step 9: Increase the control parameter 𝛼𝛼 by 0.1 interval, and 
redo from step 2 to step 8 until 𝛼𝛼 equal 1.0. 
The simulation would also be repeated for a specific number 
of times in order to achieve a meaningful result. 
III. CASE STUDIES 
To conduct in-depth analysis for the hierarchy and 
vulnerability properties of power grids in terms of real case 
except for toy model, four major power transmission networks 
from the European Network of Transmission System Operators 
(ENTSO/UCTE) have been chosen: France (FR), Germany 
(DE), Italy (IT) and Spain (ES). Some basic information of 
these four power grids are reported in Table I and their 
corresponding graphical illustrations have been plotted by 
NodeXL [30]. For each power grid, graphs are shown in the 
Appendix (Fig. 5 to Fig. 8). 
 
A. Traditional topological property analysis  
Firstly, the topological properties of thee four power 
networks are investigated by means of commonly used metrics 
in complex network analysis. We assess and compare the 
structural features of FR, DE, IT and ES power grids using 
topological metrics respectively as shown in Table II. 
 
 
According to the metrics listed in Table II, these four power 
grids are quantitatively similar and compatible from a complex 
networks point of view. However, it’s worth noting that Italy 
power network has the smallest average degree k and overall 
clustering C, which means that Italy network is sparser and 
more weakly connected than the rest of the power networks.  
B. Hierarchy metric and its trend observation 
Following the treeness calculation procedure, the treeness of 
our four major power transmission networks is calculated and 
reported in TABLE III. 
 
We observe that the treeness value of Italy is the smallest one 
in the four power grids (shown in TABLE III, bold value). 
Compared with the topological metrics in Table II, Italy 
exhibits a consistent feature of minimal values, both for pure 
topological and hierarchy metrics. 
Furthermore, we also examine the trend in hierarchy 
coordinates when power transmission networks are damaged 
by random node removal  
In our study, and in order to make the Monte Carlo based 
simulation (see section II.C) more meaningful, the simulation is 
performed 1000 times, considering the balance of 
computational burden. Fig. 2 shows the results from this 
simulation, with treeness values against the number of nodes 
removed and for each power grid. An immediate conclusion 
can be drawn from this first simulation result, which is that the 
network hierarchy trends caused by random node removal 
strategy exhibits different patterns for different power grids.  
 
TABLE I 
POWER GRID DATA SETS 
Geography  Buses Branches Generators Loads 
France 1401 1819 136 881 
Germany 1197 1714 156 602 
Italy 535 645 126 249 
Spain 447 644 100 349 
 
TABLE II 
STRUCTURAL CHARACTERISTICS OF POWER GRIDS IN TOPOLOGICAL METRICS 
Power grid <k> L C 
France 2.597 11.283 0.062 
Germany 2.779 15.420 0.075 
Italy 2.461 11.761 0.033 
Spain 2.888 8.914 0.104 
 
TABLE III 
TREENESS OF EACH ORIGINAL POWER NETWORK 
Geography France Germany Italy Spain 
Treeness -0.0334 0.0073 -0.1159 0.0997 
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To be more specific, in Fig.2 we make observations and 
corresponding hints of the four power grids from both 
topological and dynamic points of view. (The left part of the 
curves with less nodes removed are more valuable to observe, 
since they would be more realistic for power grids.). From Fig. 
2, the following observations can be summarized: 
1) Treeness values fluctuate in a very small area especially in 
the left part of the curves for each network. This feature is a 
consequence of engineering practices focused on reducing the 
wiring costs while keeping the system connected [11]. In other 
words, the power grids behave in a more planar fashion and 
generally as a less meshed graph. 
2) Italy and Spain networks have a definite stable hierarchy 
structure during the node removal procedure. The difference is 
that Italy network has a reverse pyramidal shape, while for 
Spain network is a pyramidal one. Namely, the sign of the 
hierarchy may point out some main dynamic feature of the 
network and be a critical index classifying transmission 
networks with respect to vulnerability.  
3) The treeness of the Germany network stands between that 
of Italy and Spain, and the absolute value of this metric is very 
close to 0, especially in the left part of the curves. From a 
topological view, it suggests that Germany network hierarchy 
evolution during the node removal maintains a more meshed 
structure compared to the other networks.  
4) There is a dynamic change of the treeness sign (from 
negative to positive) for France network, and the treeness is 
mainly linear with respect to the shrinking of the network island. 
Keeping in mind a common power engineering knowledge that 
fractional networks would always be less robust than the 
original complete one (less supporting power supplying lines as 
backups for failures), the evolution of vulnerability can be 
witnessed through the evolution of hierarchy in France network: 
becoming more vulnerable with more nodes removed and a 
shrinking network island. 
In short, there is an obvious linkage between the hierarchy 
trends and system dynamic scenario performed in terms of 
random node removal. Since this kind of dynamic scenario 
based on node removal is widely used for vulnerability analysis 
of different systems [6], it provides a possibility to investigate 
the network vulnerability from hierarchy evolution point of 
view. Therefore, in next section we propose a cascading 
failures model based simulation together with the network 
hierarchy evolution to study the correlation between 
vulnerability and hierarchy. 
 
Fig. 2. Hierarchy trends caused by random node removal for each power grid. Mean in purple, standard deviation in shadow.  
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C. Vulnerability and network hierarchy evolution  
In section III.B, we claimed that network hierarchy trends 
caused by node removal could be translated as a footprint of 
power grid vulnerability from complex network point of view. 
However, a more critical problem is to find out the rationality 
behind the evolution of network hierarchy, and thus to predict 
dynamic responses and damages following cascading failures 
of power grids. Therefore, in this section, a stricter examination 
concerning cascading failures involving network hierarchy 
evolution must be carried out still on the real transmission 
network cases of the four countries. 
The simulation proposed in section II.D was performed 100 
times for each power transmission grid and the average values 
of Pration V.S. 𝛼𝛼 are shown in Fig. 3. Corresponding network 
hierarchy evolution (treeness) of the four network cases is 
recorded and reported in Fig. 4. 
From Fig. 3, we observe that Italy power network has the 
most robust structure compared to the other networks, shown 
by the largest Pratio value during the whole process of variation 
of the control parameter. The interesting aspect is that the 
treeness values for the Italy network remain negative for all 𝛼𝛼 
values as shown in  Fig.4. Therefore, the first conjecture we can 
preserve is that the negative treeness during cascading failures 
may hold back the failure propagation, making the network 
more robust. This conjecture can be verified from the curve of 
France network in both Fig. 3 and Fig. 4. In this case, there is a 
leap of Pratio when the control parameter 𝛼𝛼 is increased more 
than 0.3 (shown in Fig. 3), while corresponding treeness values 
are distributed in two groups respectively, with positive and 
negative signs in Fig.4. 
 
Furthermore, from the curves of Germany and Spain 
networks in Fig. 3 we can observe two more phenomena and 
make initial judgments from the previous logic. Firstly, their 
Pratio is less than that of Italy, which means they are more 
vulnerable. Secondly Spain network is more robust than 
Germany. These initial judgments can be again validated by Fig. 
4, in which the treeness values of Germany and Spain networks 
are positive, and the Spain network generally has larger 
treeness than Germany. Thus, we could draw a second 
conjecture, which is that the network hierarchy (treeness) 
evolution under random node removal may be used as a 
measurement to quantify the robustness of power grids. 
 
 
Fig. 3. Cascades triggered by random bode removal in four power grids.   
 
Fig. 4. Network hierarchy evolution during the cascading failures. 
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In conclusion, a linkage between network hierarchy 
evolution and vulnerability can be stablished. This relationship 
can be used in many ways for power network vulnerability 
analysis, especially under cascading failures. Firstly, and most 
straight ahead, a power network cascading failure process can 
be illustrated by the hierarchy evolution from the complex 
network theory, and differently from other traditional ways, 
using shrinking network and capacity. Secondly, the network 
hierarchy evolution by random node removal strategy can also 
measure the robustness of a power network, shown by the 
consistency of results from Fig. 3 and 4. Finally, the value of 
the network treeness, which can also be easily quantified, may, 
in the same way, influence the network dynamic propagation, 
characterizing the network vulnerability under cascading 
failures. 
IV. VALIDATION FROM REAL FAILURE EVENTS 
In the previous two sections, we have used scenario-based 
statistical simulation method to suggest the linkage between 
network hierarchy evolution and vulnerability of power 
transmission grids. However, to make the simulation results 
more conclusive, we would like to validate our previous 
conjectures with empirical reliability data before making 
further conclusions of the paper: with the ENTSO providing a 
set of real malfunction data of power transmission grids [31] for 
our validation purpose, statistics of major events from the year 
2000 to 2015 are reported in Table IV.  
Comparing with the vulnerability ranking of the four 
countries from previous simulation results, the statistics of 
major events show supportive conclusions that Italy network 
has the minimum number of failures while France network has 
the maximum one, which means from a practical point of view 
that Italy network is more robust and that the France network is 
more fragile in these four power grids. This conclusion is 
surprisingly coincident with the results from our previous 
simulations. Therefore, our proposed linkage between network 
hierarchy evolution and vulnerability can be confirmed from 
both simulation and empirical data. 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, a hierarchy metric has been for the first time 
introduced in the vulnerability assessment of power 
transmission grids. We have analysed the hierarchy evolution 
of four major ENTSO power grids: Italy, Germany, Spain and 
France. We have been able to rank the robustness of these 
networks and, more importantly, we have shown that hierarchy 
evolutions are highly correlated with network vulnerability 
under both static network conditions and network cascading 
failures. As it is evident from our experimental results in these 
four major ENTSO power grids, our methodology can be 
extended to other applications of the hierarchy evolution to the 
vulnerability analysis of power grids, or even more generally in 
any other complex network similarly defined. 
Future extensive applications of network hierarchy evolution 
in power engineering, can be listed, but not limited, in the 
following aspects. 1) The most direct application of hierarchy 
metric for power engineering would be the estimation of power 
network vulnerability and the ranking of their important 
elements by the observations of hierarchy trends, as it has been 
done in section 3. 2) A prediction for the severity of cascading 
failures introduced by the loss of important network elements 
can be accomplished in terms of hierarchy, a mathematical 
index, instead of circumstantial simulation with the whole 
network and particular scenarios. 3) The capability of hierarchy 
in identifying different significance of network elements and 
districts in improving system vulnerability can be applied for 
future power network planning (e.g., enhancement and 
expanding). 4) Last but not least, for a robust application of the 
hierarchy evolution, a line of future work of the paper must be 
centered around the problem of taking into account the 
uncertainties from network interconnections and large 
penetration of distributed generation, thus to determine the 
impact for network vulnerability under these two 
circumstances. 
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APPENDIX 
THE SIZE OF THE NODES IN EACH GRAPH IS PROPORTIONAL TO DEGREE 
 
 
TABLE IV 
MAJOR EVENTS OF EACH POWER GRID 
Network  Germany France Italy Spain 
Major events count 83 250 43 175 
 
 
Fig. 5. Network structure of France power transmission network. 
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